In December, 2012, Park Geun-hye was elected president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Her election was noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First of all, she became the first women ever to serve as the president of Korea. Second, she is the first child of a previous president of the ROK to rise to the same high office. Those two departures from tradition are related. It is highly unlikely that the voters of South Korea would have chosen Park to be their next president if she had not been cloaked in the aura of her father’s economic record. Park Chung Hee took the ROK from poverty to prosperity over the eighteen years he was in charge, and the majority of voters clearly hoped his daughter could be equally effective in managing the economy.

However, the vote was not unanimous. She was elected by a respectable but slim majority, 51.6% of the vote to 48% for her opponent. A significant minority of the ROK population doesn’t share the positive image of Park Chung Hee held by the majority. That became clear a few months after Park Geun-hye took her oath of office in February, 2013. In July, 2013, Hong Ik-p’yo, at the time the parliamentary spokesperson for the main opposition party, described her as the child of someone who never should have been born. This expression of intense antipathy for Park Chung Hee threw Korean politics in another one of its frequent uproars, suspending the work of the National Assembly for a couple of days.

Park Chung Hee died in 1979. Yet decades later he remains a divisive figure in Korean politics, with Koreans unable to agree on whether he should be revered for his contributions to Korea’s economic development or reviled for his authoritarian politics. Other issues from decades past also continue to provoke intense debates, revealing that Koreans have widely divergent memories of traumatic events in recent history. Japanese absorbed what had been the independent kingdom of Korea into its empire in 1910, over a century ago. Korea regained its independence in the 1940s. Yet how to remember those few decades of colonial rule, well over half a century after they ended, is still contested. The publication in 2009 of a Dictionary of Collaborators (ch’inil inmyŏng sajŏn) has kept alive the issue of the nationalism, or the lack thereof, among the Korean people when they were under Japanese rule. The Korea War, though fighting ended in 1953, is also the subject of competing memories, with no broad agreement among South Koreans over whether it was a civil war, with South Korea itself split between leftists and rightists, or an act of naked aggression by outsiders from north of the 38th parallel that splits the Korean peninsula in half. And the Kwangju uprising of May, 1980, though it has been officially designated a “Democratization Movement,” was once again the center of heated debated in 2013, when two cable TV networks revived assertions of a North Korean role in that uprising against a military coup.
Collective Memories and Competing Identities

South Korea is a relatively young nation, as modern nations go, though Korea itself has a very long history as an independent country. For over five centuries, from 1392 to 1910, Korea was an independent kingdom known as Chosŏn. For four and a half centuries before that, from 935 to 1392, it was the kingdom of Koryŏ (which gave us the name Korea). However, the Korea we see today is very different from the Korea that existed before the twentieth century. First of all, Korea, which was one country for a thousand years, is now split in two, with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the Republic of Korea in the south. Moreover, over the last half century, South Korea has undergone a dramatic transformation, moving from poverty and dictatorship to prosperity and democracy, and, in the process, from predominantly rural to overwhelmingly urban.

This transformation has been so rapid, occurring over less than half a century, that a clear identity for South Korea has yet to emerge. The vast majority of South Koreans agree that the ROK has inherited the legitimacy of the governments on the peninsula that preceded the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. South Koreans also agree that South Korea is very different from North Korea, not only because it is the only legitimate successor to Korea’s kingdoms but in many other significant aspects as well. However, they disagree over how to rank those differences. Is South Korea different from North Korea primarily because it is prosperous and an economic power in the global economy while North Korea is poor and isolated from global markets, or is South Korea different from North Korea primarily because it is democratic, with a vigorously contested elections, a free press, and an elected president and parliament, while North Korea is a dictatorship ruled by the third generation of the Kim dynasty with no political debate allowed. Of course, all South Koreans recognize that their country is more democratic and more prosperous than its neighbor to the north, but they disagree over which difference to emphasize.

Those differences in emphasis are revealed in the history battles that continue to rage in South Korea.

Should those who worked with the Japanese during the decades of colonial rule be dismissed as a small minority with no impact on how Korea developed after 1945 or should the influence of former collaborators in independent Korea be noted and criticized? Should the Korean War be seen as a civil war between Koreans divided by different visions of what Korea should look like or should it be seen as aggression against the capitalist economy Korea was trying to create? Should Park Chung Hee be revered for starting Korea on the path to prosperity or should he be criticized for delaying democratization? Should the Kwangju tragedy of 1980 be seen as an important step in Korea’s progress toward democratization and therefore should the people of Kwangju be honored as heroes or should it be seen as a minor incident that have little impact on Korea’s rise to respectability in global markets today?

How to remember these events from the past is at the core of South Korean politics today. The right, led in the second decade of the twentieth century by the daughter of Park
Chung Hee, wants to focus on continuing economic development, which they see as the defining feature of South Korea and the major difference between South Korea and North Korea. They believe that to do so, old debates about collaborators, the Korean War, the legacy of Park Chung Hee, or the significance of Kwangju must be pushed aside as largely irrelevant. The left, on the other hand, insists that South Korea’s identity is rooted not in its factories and corporations but in its people and their power to choose their own government. Fearing that democracy is not yet firmly established in South Korea, they insist that until the issue of collaborators, the nature of the Korean War, the impact of Park Chung Hee on political culture, and the Kwangju tragedy are given the attention they deserve, as well as what the left considers their correct interpretations, the possibility that Korea may suffer another turn away from democracy as it did in 1961 (the year Park seized control of the government through a military coup) and 1980 (the year of another military coup, one that provoked the Kwangju uprising) remains a real possibility.

The history wars in South Korea today are the product of attempts to promote different collective memories to support competing definitions of South Korea. Moreover, behind those competing concepts of South Korean national identity lie opposing political agendas. On the right, the assumption that Korea must be united in order to be strong enough to overcome the continuing threat from North Korea leads them to downplay or even suppress any narratives that highlight differences within the South Korean population, whether those differences are between anti-Japanese activists and collaborators, between leftists and rightists in the years leading up to the Korean War, between Park Chung Hee supporters and pro-democracy activists in the 1970s, or between the people of Kwangju and the majority of the people in the rest of the country in 1980. The left, on the other hand, believes that papering over real differences in the past creates a false democracy in which many important voices are silenced. For the left, that is a serious mistake since the broader the range of actors included in Korea’s history and in Korea’s current politics, the broader will be the base of Korean democracy. That broader base will make Korea itself a much stronger nation, one that will therefore be better positioned to deal with North Korea.

North Korea is always in the background when South Koreans debate how to define South Korea. They debate over how best to contrast South Korea with North Korea and over what sort of country South Korea should be in order to deal successfully with North Korea in the years and maybe even decades to come. Moreover, both sides believe that their particular vision of South Korea’s past serves an essential integrative function, binding South Koreans together as citizens of one nation, while the opposing side’s views play a disintegrative role, turning South Koreans against South Koreans and hindering the formation of a unified national community. Those on the right assume that the differences that existed in the past must be downplayed in the interest of creating unity today, though they nevertheless wish to exclude people on the left they view as holding views contrary to South Korea’s national interest. Those on the left, on the other hand, assume that true unity is possible only when those with a leftist orientation are included in the national community. Such different approaches to defining South Korea, and different visions of
what national unity requires, make it difficult to end the battles over history and achieve national reconciliation.

Governments and Collective Memories

Successive governments in the Republic of Korea, both authoritarian and democratic, have tried to promote memories of the most traumatic events of modern Korean history that are compatible with their particular ideological orientations. For each of those episodes, the colonial period, the Korean War, the Park Chung Hee era, and the Kwangju uprising, there is a clear left-right divide over how to interpret their impact on Korea, and how to evaluate and remember the actions of Koreans caught up in those events.

Authoritarian governments, such as those of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960), Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-Hwan (2000-2008), tried to suppress memories which conflict with the memories they preferred. For example, in order to enhance their nationalistic image, they tried to eliminate any suggestions that they or their officials may have cooperated with the Japanese during the colonial period. They also suppressed any public discussions of human rights abuses by their governments and its supporters. To do that, Rhee, Park, and Chun relied on censorship, controlling what could be said about the past in what was published and what was shown on the movie screen. Right-of-center democratic governments, such as that of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), are subtler. Lee’s government attempted to control, discredit, and then limit funding for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that had been established in 2005 to shed light on collaboration during the colonial era and human rights abuses after 1945. (D.C. Kim 2013; D. C. Kim and M. Seldon 2010) That commission was shut down at the end of 2010.

Democratic governments, such as those led by Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo Hyun (2003-08), have been subtler. Just as authoritarian governments have done, they promoted the centuries-old Korean tradition of moralistic historiography that distinguishes good people who contribute to society from those who do it harm. The movement at the beginning of the twentieth century to “sweep away the vestiges of the past” by publicizing the “truth” about the past is one example of this. One way to do this was through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This movement was intended to restore honor to pro-democracy activists who were believed to have been denied proper recognition of the positive role they played in history, or to have been unjustly imprisoned, tortured, or even executed by past governments. This “cleansing of the past” movement was also designed to ensure that those who acted against what Korea’s progressives perceived as Korea’s national interest be identified and appropriately scorned. It was led by members of what are called the “386” generation, so-called because they had been born in the 1960s, gone to university in the 1980s, and, in the 1990s when this term was coined, were in their 30s. In other words, they were those whose formative experience was not the colonial period or the Korean War but the struggle for democracy. When they gained political power during the Kim Dae Jung and Roo Moo Hyun administrations, they used that power to reverse what had been the official verdict on the democratization movement.
Korean battles over how to narrate the recent past are particularly intense because of the importance Koreans have traditionally placed on history. Korea has a long tradition of writing histories. The oldest extant history of Korea, the *Samguk sagi* [Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms], was compiled almost 900 years ago and was itself based on earlier histories not longer extant. History was one of the tools Koreans drew for centuries on to establish a separate and distinct cultural and national identity in Northeast Asia. History remains useful in defining the Korean identity today. In the case of South Korea, recent history, and how it is understood, interpreted, and remembered, is essential to the construction of a national identity for South Korea. However, reaching a consensus on that history, forming a national collective memory, has proven to be a difficult task.

Human beings, both as individuals and as social groups, are defined by their memories of what they have done and been. However, crafting an identity from such memories is not as simple a process as it may at first appear. Both collective memories and individuals’ memories are constructed by weaving different strands into one fabric to form a coherent but manufactured whole. The key word here is “manufactured.” It is not an automatic process. It is impossible for every single thing we have ever done or been to be given equal weight. Instead, we, both individuals and societies, have to decide which memories are essential to our identity and which are not. In other words, constructing memories requires choosing, either consciously or unconsciously, which strands, which particular memories, to include in that fabric and which to leave out. Since both individual and collective memories are manufactured, something has to be left out and therefore those memories are incomplete. However, they feel natural rather than manufactured and complete rather than incomplete because the identity those memories create is precisely the identity of the person or group that manufactured them. To deny that our memories are real would be to deny our self-identity, since it is our memories that define us.

It is this equation of our memories with our identity that makes history wars so heated. Different individuals, and different social groups, use different strands and therefore construct separate identities. To challenge any of those threads integral to a particular individual or collective memory by putting forward different memories as somehow more valid threatens to unravel the entire fabric of which that individual or collective was created. To try to extract as invalid particular memories from the collective memory in which they are embedded threatens the very existence of the person or group defined by that collective memory. Trying to add additional threads to that fabric similarly threatens to change that fabric and undermine the entity it defines. As a result of this identification of memory and identity, history wars often become personal battles, in which each side feels it is fighting for its very right to exist.

There are many battles over the past in which South Koreans, and usually North Koreans as well, stand together on one side and Japan or China stand on the other. Those battles, seen in Lee Myung-bak’s 2012 visit to the island of Tokto (which Japan insists belongs to Japan and should be called Takeshima), in the erection in 2011 of a bronze status of a “comfort woman” across the street from the Japanese embassy in downtown Seoul, and in the establishment of the Northeast Asia History Foundation by the government of South Korea in 2006 to counter Chinese claims to ownership of the ancient Manchurian
kingdoms of Koguryŏ and Parhae, are just as heated today as the internal battles among South Koreans that wage alongside them. In 2008 my university, the University of British Columbia, hosted a seminar on Koguryŏ for scholars from China, North Korea, and South Korea. It was fascinating to watch the North and South Koreans putting aside their many differences to unite in vigorously objecting to the Chinese claim that Koguryŏ was not a Korean state but instead was a subordinate state of the Chinese empire. Koguryŏ is an essential part of the Korean memory of the history that defines Korea. Koreans from both the north and south therefore felt that China, by claiming that Koguryŏ was Chinese, was threatening the very identity of Koreans as Koreans.

Despite those rare moments of agreements, there are continuing heated history wars between North and South Korea. In 2013 North Korea celebrated the 60th anniversary of what it calls its victory against the American invaders in the Korean War. South Koreans instead remember a North Korean invasion of the south that ended in defeat for the North. North Korea claims that Kim Il Sung, the grandfather of the current leader of the DPRK, almost singlehandedly defeated the Japanese and forced them to end their occupation of the Korean peninsula in 1945. South Koreans credit American military might, particularly the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the defeat of the Japanese empire that resulted in Korea regaining its independence. Reconciling those contradictory visions of recent Korean history will much more difficult than reconciling the divergent views of South Koreans alone.

In this chapter, however, I will put aside discussion of Korean disputes with their neighbors as well as disputes between North and South Korea to concentrate on disputes among South Koreans. Within nations, and in this chapter I treat South Korea as a separate and distinct nation, groups use different historical narratives to create, nurture, and sustain different collective memories in order to both promote in-group solidarity and create rhetorical tools to wield as weapons in political struggles. Let us now look at the four traumatic events in modern Korean history that have been the basis for such differences in collective memories: the period of Japanese colonial rule, the Korean War, the period of authoritarian rule under Park Chung Hee, and the Kwangju Uprising of May, 1980.

Korea’s Colonial Experience, 1910-45

The first traumatic event Korea as a nation endured in the twentieth century was the thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule that followed the loss of independence in 1910. The hegemonic collective memory of the first half of the 20th century, promoted by both governments and scholars, has been that very few Koreans collaborated with the Japanese during the decades they were under direct Japanese rule. Most Koreans today assume that Japanese rule did not benefit Korea in any way and therefore only a small number of Koreans would have willingly cooperated with the Japanese exploitation of Korea and Koreans.

History textbooks used in Korean classrooms focus on the resistance by Koreans to Japanese oppression. That resistance was real, but it is only part of the story. Many
Koreans tolerated Japanese rule, and quite a few helped the Japanese maintain control over Korea. The story of Korean behavior from 1910 to 1945 is an ambiguous one, as anyone would realize if he or she had read and reflected on *T’aep’yŏng ch’ŏnha* [Peace Under Heaven], a comic novel first published in Korea in 1938 by Ch’ae Manshik. (Ch’ae 1993) Though *Peace Under Heaven* is clearly fiction, it would not have been so popular in its day if its depiction of a Korean who profited from Japanese rule had not rung true.

However, the assumption that Japanese rule was an unmitigated evil, and no self-respecting Korean would have worked with the Japanese, has led to the further assumption that those who did collaborate must have both few in number and as evil as their Japanese overlords. Over the last couple of decades, there has been an upsurge of interest in identifying those “evil” collaborators. (De Ceuster 2001; Chung 2002) This growing interest led in 2009 to the publication of a *Biographical Dictionary of Collaborators* with information on over 4,300 people identified as collaborators. Among them is Park Chung Hee, whose service as a Japanese imperial army officer under the name of Masao Takagi provides grounds for including him on that list. The information provided in that book has proved so popular that it has even been made available as an iphone app. On another front, in 2005 Kang Man-gil was named by Roh Moo Hyun the first chairman of a national commission to find out the truth about “pro-Japanese anti-Korean elements in Korean society.” Like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, however, that commission was also shut down in 2010 by Lee Myung-bak.iii

That some Koreans “collaborated” with the Japanese is undeniable, especially since the assumption in Korea today is that anyone who cooperated with the Japanese in any significant way, and profited by doing so, rather than resisting was a collaborator. However, the dominant collective memory forgets how many collaborated in that broad understanding of the term. Given the broad bush with which Koreans paint the image of collaboration, there must have been many more than the 4,300+ who are listed in the collaborators’ biographical dictionary. Hildi Kang’s collection of first-person accounts of life during the colonial period presents a much more nuanced range of reactions to Japanese rule in the words of Korean who lived through that period and found that, in order to survive, they had to cooperate with their Japanese overlords. (Kang 2001) Unfortunately, few have been willing to pay much attention to her challenge to the hegemonic discourse.

Moreover, when an American scholar pointed out that a well-respected businessman and politician, Kim Sŏngsu (1891-1951), had worked closely with the Japanese before 1945, that scholar was harshly criticized for daring to suggest that a pillar of the post-1945 nationalist establishment may have been a “collaborator,” though that American scholar never used that particular pejorative term. (Eckert 1991) Among the attacks on Eckert’s attempt to question how widespread anti-Japanese resistance was a book that launched a direct challenge to Eckert’s depiction of Kim Sŏngsu with its title: *A Korean Nationalist Entrepreneur: A Life History of Kim Sŏngsu, 1891-1955.* (Kim C.S. 1998) There appears to be a strong collective will to block out memories of anything that would suggest that the majority of Koreans living in colonial Korea were not obsessed every minute of the day with resisting Japanese oppression.

Much of the surge in interest in identifying a few conspicuous collaborators was
motivated by the politics that prevailed during the Roh Moo Hyun administration. One way to attack the popularity of Park Geun-hye, the president from 2013 but the leader of the main opposition party during much of the previous decade, was to repeatedly point out that her father, the assassinated conservative authoritarian president Park Chung Hee (1917-79), was a collaborator. Nevertheless, outside of a few bold academics, few question whether the few thousand Koreans listed in the dictionary of collaborators represent the full extent of collaboration with the Japanese during those thirty-five years of colonial rule or whether collaboration may have been much more common than that. Anyone who suggests that resistance to Japanese rule was not almost universal risks being accused of insulting the Korean people. Moreover, recognizing how much of the Korean population cooperated with the Japanese would render the frequently expressed desire to cleanse Korea of all traces of such collaboration much more difficult, if not impossible. Therefore debate within South Korea on the issue of collaboration tends to revolve around whether a limited number of specific individuals should be labeled collaborators or not, not over how widespread cooperation with the Japanese was. The right has tried to define collaboration very narrowly to protect the reputations of many of its early leaders, who first gained experience in government, business and the military under Japanese rule, while the left has tried to broaden that definition to discredit those very same leaders.

The Korean War, 1950-53

The debate over the Korean War is much wider ranging. Not surprisingly, that debate has brought the left-right split in Korean memories into even sharper focus. After all, not only was the Korean War one of the first major military conflicts in the Cold War pitting the forces of Communism against those of Capitalism, it also was a result of decades of arguments within the Korean nationalist community over how to resist the Japanese and what Korea should look like after the Japanese went home. Korea already had a sharp left-right divide before 1945, with Communists favoring armed resistance in one camp and, in the other camp, non-Communists, ranging from those who also favored violence to those who emphasized diplomacy and education as the most effective method for Korea to regain its independence. However, that political dispute did not break out into fratricidal violence until independence was handed to Korea by the outside forces that had defeated Japan. That foreign intervention meant that Korea ended up after 1945 split into a north under the control of the Soviet Union and their Korean Communist allies and a south under the control of the United States and its anti-Communist allies. The reinforcing by foreign forces of already existing internal political disagreements heightened tension between the two sides, eventually leading to full-scale war in 1950. Scholars both in and outside of Korea argue today over whether the Korean War should be portrayed as primarily a civil war, rooted in disputes among the Koreans themselves, or as primarily growing out of the competition between the US and the USSR for hegemony in East Asia.

However, the official and therefore dominant narrative in South Korea has been that North Korea launched a sudden unprovoked attack on June 25, 1950, and that south Koreans were almost unanimously opposed to Communism. The existence of a significant leftist movement in the southern part of the peninsula before 1950 was at first downplayed or denied altogether. (Yoon, 1992) That began to change in the 1990s,
The availability in Korean bookstores of a Korean translation of Bruce Cumings’s masterful study, *The Origins of the Korean War.* (Cumings 1981 and 1990)⁸ The blind spot in South Korean memories of the late 1940s and early 1950s shrunk even more in the 21st century under the presidency of Roh Moo-hyun, whose father-in-law had been jailed for his alleged “partisan” [the south Korean term for leftist guerrillas] activities. (Lee 2003, 68)

The first signs of change appeared, however, in 1994 when the movie “Taebaek sanmaek” (The Taebaek Mountain Range), by the renowned director Im Kwontaek, hit Korean movie screens. (Kim 2004) That movie, which showed bad guys and good guys in both the communist and anti-communist camps, and made clear that both sides were South Koreans, attracted a lot of criticism from those who do not want to be reminded that South Korea was not totally anti-Communist in the late 1940s, and that not all the atrocities before and during the war were committed by communists.⁹ In 2005 Cho Chŏng-nae, the author of the novel on which that movie was based, was finally cleared of legal charges the movie provoked, namely, that his novel had violated South Korea’s National Security Law. (Hankyoreh 2005) Even today, any politician or professor in South Korea who dares to point out that Kim Il Sung’s invasion of the south in 1950 was intended to reunify a divided country (which seems a fairly obvious conclusion) can expect to be condemned as a leftist subversive and possibly even face legal action.¹⁰ However, some dare to do so anyway, and debates over the Korean War are beginning to break out on Korean campus and in the media. There was even a popular movie released in 2004, “Taegûggi “(known in English as “The Brotherhood of War”), that dared to show the ambivalence many young men felt about joining the South Korean army during that war, though that ambivalence was rooted less in leftist resistance to the ROK government than in reluctance to join in a war that literally pitted brothers against brothers. A similar blurring of the moral fault lines can be seen, surprisingly, in the War Memorial that opened next door to the US 8th Army Headquarters in Seoul in the 1990s. Though that museum doesn’t question the narrative of the Korean war that makes North Korea the aggressor, it downplays the brutality both sides displayed during that conflict and instead focuses on the hope of a future reconciliation so that there will be no intra-Korean war in the future. (Jager and Kim 2007)

Those who still insist on drawing a sharp line between good, nationalist South Koreans and bad, aggressive North Korean communists are often people who lived through that war and insist that the more nuanced approach to interpreting the Korean War runs contrary to their personal memories. They “remember” the war in black and white and resist any attempt to paint it shades of grey. However, it is clear that much of their memory has been shaped by the anti-Communist atmosphere of post-war South Korea and the strict government control (which only began to ease in the 1990s) over how that war could be portrayed by writers and filmmakers. (Lee 2007, pp.70-108)

Only recently have South Korean scholars and the press been able to discuss openly the atrocities committed by South Korean and US troops during the Korean War and the years that immediately preceded it. In 2000 Kim Dong-choon (Kim Tong-ch’un) published a powerful study of the impact of the Korean war on the South Korean population, focusing on the killing of innocent civilians by both Communist and non-Communist forces. (Kim Tong-ch’un, 2000) A few years later the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission began publishing the results of its own investigations into atrocities committed by US and ROK forces. (Suh, 2013) This exposure of misconduct by non-Communist forces provoked a strong negative reaction from many Koreans on the right. They complained that such charges were misleading because, first of all, there were very few leftists in South Korea so there were very few targets for such brutal treatment and, secondly, if there really were any leftists in South Korea at that time, they were traitors and deserved the treatment they received. They also insisted that those who made those allegations did so to weaken the resolve of the South Korea people to resist any future Communist aggression. Rather than bringing reconciliation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission instead fueled the mistrust between the two sides.

The Park regime, 1961-79.

It took South Korea about a decade to recover from the devastation of the Korean War. Once the economy began to grow rapidly in the 1960s, it do so under the guidance of a former general who had seized control of the government in a military coup in 1961. That general was Park Chung Hee. He went on to rule South Korea for 18 years, from 1961 to 1979. Under his regime, Korea went from being a poverty-stricken nation to a nation on the verge of middle-class status. That had been Park’s goal. He wanted Korea to defeat North Korea in the race to see which would be the first to develop a fully industrialized economy recognized as a major player in world markets. However, he didn’t expect that, as the economy developed under his direction, space would be created for civil society, making it more and more difficult for the government to impose an official interpretation on recent history.

Korea’s newly empowered civil society challenged the collective memory Park and his immediate successors tried to impose. No one has forgotten the rapid economic development under Park’s rule. Over his 18 years in power, per capita annual GNP rose from $82 in 1961 to $1,662 in 1979. (Song 1990, 80) However, even when Park had Korea under his iron thumb (in 1972 he eliminated elections for the presidency and outlawed any criticism of his government), there were small groups of activists, drawn primarily from labor activists, university students, and Christians, protesting the price workers, farmers, and dissident intellectuals had to pay for Park’s single-minded focus on achieving a rapid rise in Korea’s GNP. Workers were denied the right to form labor unions and, as a result, were unable to fight for livable wages and decent working conditions. Farmers suffered from an economy that depended on cheap food to feed a growing urban labor force. And students and intellectuals faced arrest, torture, and jail if they spoke out against Park’s authoritarian rule, especially after 1972. (Robinson 2007, pp. 127-139; Sohn 2007, pp. 125-222) After Park was assassinated in 1979, those who had challenged his policies when he was alive contested the memory of what it had been like to live under his rule.

Park is accurately given credit for putting the Korean economy on the path to prosperity. However, he was also a dictator who had innocent people executed for opposing his policies. Koreans today disagree over whether his economic accomplishments should overshadow his human rights records, or whether we need to highlight his authoritarian policies as a warning to future generations to never let a South Korean government go in that direction again. As was seen in the 2012 presidential election results, most Koreans who lived through that time remember him primarily for the economic growth he
promoted.

However, those who fought against his dictatorship, and suffered for doing so, remember his brutal dictatorial ways. In the immediate aftermath of Park assassination in 1979, they were forced to remain silent by the dictatorial regime that followed his. Even then, however, there were attempts to promote counter-memories. It was not until almost 30 years after Park was shot by Kim Jae-kyu, the head of his own Central Intelligence Agency, that Park’s legacy could be debated openly. In fact, the presence of Park Geun-hye in the presidential office in 2013 made many Koreans feel it is urgent to come to some kind of definitive judgment of her father, to declare once and for all whether Park Chung Hee’s rule was good or bad for Korea in the long run.\textsuperscript{x}\textsuperscript{i}

One question now being asked is, “Was his dictatorship necessary?” The answer to that question usually varies according to the political orientation of the person answering the question. Those who “remember” the protesters of that time as dangerous leftists continue to argue that Park’s iron fist was what made it possible for the Korean economy to grow as fast as it did. On the other hand, those who were tortured under Park, or had friends or family members who were tortured, tend to let the memories of that personal pain outweigh any consideration of growth in GNP.

Even Park’s harshest critics don’t deny that the economy grew substantially under his iron hand. Memories of the poverty of Korea in the 1950s and the 1960s are still too fresh in the minds of the older generation to be forgotten. However, to say that economic growth occurred does not obviate the questions “Was the economic development that occurred under dictatorship good for the country, or should the benefits of that growth been distributed more broadly and justly? And would the economy have grown as fast or even faster under a more democratic government?”

The struggle over how to remember and evaluate the Park regime is waged in bookstores, movie theaters, history classrooms, and even the halls of the national assembly, as shown in the 2013 outburst by parliamentarian Hong Ik-p’yo that Park Chung Hee should never have been born. Hong had been a member of the Roh Moo Hyun administration, under which cases of those Park had jailed and even executed on political charges were re-examined to determine if they were really guilty as charged. In many instances, the conclusion was that they were innocent victims.\textsuperscript{x}\textsuperscript{ii} Another sign that Park can now be openly portrayed in a negative light is a 2005 movie about his 1979 assassination. That movie, called in English ”The President’s Last Bang” (Kūddae kūsaramdūl, in Korean) shows Park as more obsessed with power and sex than with developing the economy. Because such negative portrayals of Park would have been illegal in earlier decades, public memories of the Park years tended to be positive. Now that contrasting memories can compete openly, that is changing. Nevertheless, positive memories still dominate, as was shown in his daughter’s election as president in 2012.

In 2012 the Park Chung Hee Presidential Library and Museum opened in northwest Seoul.\textsuperscript{x}\textsuperscript{iii} That memorial hall is clearly designed to reinforce Park’s positive image. One of the first thing visitors to that building will see are four statements by foreign scholars, two of whom (Carter Eckert and Ezra Vogel) are Harvard professors, praising Park’s economic accomplishments. On the wall facing those statements is a chronology of Park’s life, starting in 1961. Nothing is said about his life before he seized power.
Moreover, the various exhibits focus on his economic accomplishments, including his New Village Movement that raised the living standards of farmers substantially and the dramatic increase in exports under his presidency, and on his personality as a loving husband and father, including a photo of him holding the family Chihuahua. Nothing is said about his suppression of democracy.

Outside that hall, a different depiction of Park Chung Hee can be found. In 2012 Chongsik Lee published a detailed study of Park’s life before 1961, including his years in the Japanese military and his involvement with leftist groups in the immediate post-liberation period. Lee, C.S., 2012) And across town from the Park Chung Hee memorial hall, since 2002 the Democracy Foundation has been producing written materials and videos exalting the activists who fought against the South Korean dictators, including Park Chung Hee. In mid-2013 the lead story on the Democracy Foundation webpage was about the 1972 kidnapping of opposition politician (and later president) Kim Daejung by Park’s government. Other incidents of human rights’ violations during the Park years are also documented in that foundation’s publications.

At the present time, there is no hegemonic collective memory of Park Chung Hee. He is variously viewed as a resolute, hard-working, revolutionary leader; a nationalist hero with a passion for independence and self-reliance; and a man who lived a thrifty, modest, and incorruptible life as well as an anti-national, pro-Japanese traitor; an immoral opportunist, and a brutal dictator and destroyer of democracy. (Moon 2009) It may take another generation or two, after those who lived under his rule have passed away, before South Koreans will be able to agree on whether Park was good or bad for Korea in the long term.

The Kwangju Tragedy May 18-27, 1980

The last of the four contested traumatic events discussed in this chapter is the most recent. The southwestern city of Kwangju (sometimes spelled Gwangju) was attacked on 18 May 1980 by South Korean armed forces in order to suppress peaceful demonstrations by supporters of Kim Dae Jung. The day before a small group of generals, led by Chun Doo Hwan, had carried out a coup d’ état in order to prevent free elections which may have brought Kim Daejung to power. Kwangju was the capital of Kim’s home province and a stronghold of his supporters. When his supporters continued to demonstrate despite those first assaults on the morning of May 18, the military responded with even more deadly brutality. The citizens of Kwangju united against those attacks and pushed the troops out of the city on May 21, only to be overwhelmed on the morning of May 27 when the military returned with greater numbers and deadlier weaponry.

In the immediate aftermath of the May 18-27 attacks on Kwangju, the official account was that Kwangju had been taken over by a small number of rioters, and the government had no choice but to use force to restore order. That was never the way the people in Kwangju at that time remembered it, but it was the only way that incident could be publicly described for much of the 1980s and therefore the only way most Koreans outside Kwangju remembered it. (Lewis 2002) Some people still accept the official narrative. For example, John A. Wickham, who was the commander of US Forces in Korea in the spring of 1980, wrote in his memoirs of his time in Korea that Kwangju had been taken over by rioters. (Wickham 1999) The American ambassador to Korea at the
time, William H. Gleysteen, was a little kinder to the people of Kwangju, but he still described the situation there as “chaos” that had to be suppressed by military force. (Gleysteen 1999) In their characterizations of the situation in Kwangju, both men are relying on what they were told by Korean government and military officials at the time as well as what those officials told them in conversations later.

Starting in 1987, the government-imposed memory, which had never really taken hold in Kwangju itself, began to be challenged publicly elsewhere in Korea. As Korea began moving away from authoritarian rule, it became possible to discuss what happened in Kwangju and even to debate what to call it. Koreans began to discuss several key issues. Should they focus on the 1,000 to 2,000 who were killed (few scholars limit the number of dead to the official figure of around 200) and call it the Kwangju Massacre? Should they focus their memories on streets filled with tens of thousands of citizens peacefully demanding an end to the military rule and call it the “Kwangju democratization movement”? (In the mid-1990s, that became the official name of that incident.) Or should they do as many activists do and focus on the few who formed a citizens’ militia that seized weapons in order to fight against the government troops who had invaded their city and killed their fellow Kwangjuites? If they choose that third approach to remembering the Kwangju uprising, then their preferred term becomes “The Kwangju People’s Righteous Uprising.” That last label is preferred both by many of those who were active participants in the resistance in Kwangju itself and by those who were not in Kwangju in 1980 but want to convert Kwangju into a symbol of popular resistance to oppression and injustice.

What we call the Kwangju tragedy reflects what we want that incident to mean as much as it does what we actually remember. If we are from Kwangju and want to think of our city as a Mecca of democracy (as the Kwangju city government now calls it), then our memories will focus on peaceful protests and we will try to forget the bloody battles between the troops and the citizen’s militia in the streets of Kwangju. If we are progressive activists and want to feel a connection with a revolutionary movement, then we will think more about the citizen’s militia and less about the average inhabitant of the city at that time. For me personally, my most powerful memories are of people weeping over their dead. “Kwangju massacre” is the term that best reflects those memories. For many other Koreans, however, the Kwangju tragedy was nothing more than one of many steps in Korea’s climb toward democracy. They may call it a democratization movement or they may even call it simply the Kwangju incident, but, either way, they don’t think it deserves the amount of attention the people of Kwangju devote to it. Nor are they willing to concede that the tens of thousands supported the resistance in Kwangju, many more than the few radicals the original government report blamed.

In Kwangju today, over 30 years after that tragic event, a May 18 “democracy festival” takes place annually. (Lewis 2002, pp. 99-104) However, many of those who were in Kwangju in 1980 refuse to participate in that festival because a costumed mascot (the “spirit of democracy”) dancing down the streets on which blood once flowed does not fit well with their memories. Others, however, want to celebrate in order to reinforce happier memories, memories of how the people of Kwangju came together to resist authoritarian rule.

The memory of the Kwangju tragedy, like that of the Park regime, has not yet crystallized,
not even in the city of Kwangju itself or among those who actually have personal
members of those terrible days. There are Kwangjuites who felt in 1980, and still feel
today, that the resistance to the brutal attacks on May 18 aggravated the soldiers, and is
the reason the Special Forces troops were even more brutal in the days that followed.
Others argued then, and still argue today, that the citizens of Kwangju had to take up
arms against those soldiers so that the rest of Korea would know that the people of
Kwangju were willing to fight for democracy. (Kim D.S. 1999)

How the Kwangju tragedy should be remembered is therefore still being contested.
Festivals promoting happier memories compete with books and other media products
with titles like “The May 18th movement remains unfinished” produced by progressives
who continue to promote memories of Kwangju as a source of revolutionary inspiration.
(Baker 2003) The popularity of the 2007 movie “May 18” (Hwaryŏhan hyuga, in Korean),
with its realistic scenes of street violence, reinforced the image of the people of Kwangju
rising up in righteous self-defense against a brutal military coup. So did the 2013 music
video “It’s my fault” (sŭlpŭn yaksok, in Korean) by the K-Pop group Speed, which
depicts high school students resisting the brutality of the Special Forces.

On the other hand, there are still some who see that violence in Kwangju as such an
aberration in modern ROK history that it could only have been caused by North Korean
instigators. In May, 2013, two cable channels, each run by a major national newspaper,
broadcast interviews with North Korean defectors who claimed that 600 North Korean
soldiers had infiltrated Kwangju and instigated the uprising against the South Korean
government. (Korea Joongang Daily, 2013). That unsubstantiated charge was quickly
retracted by those networks but the fact that they aired such a report at all, 33 years after
the Kwangju tragedy, shows that Koreans have still not been able to reconcile conflicting
memories of what happened in May, 1980. Moreover, even more measured depictions of
the Kwangju uprising often describe the citizens of Kwangju, angered by the arrest of
their hometown hero Kim Daejung on May 17, grabbing weapons first, with soldiers
responding with force to that threat. Such a narrative, though it depicts the people of
Kwangju fighting political injustice instead of being manipulated by North Korean agents,
nevertheless reinforces a negative image of Kwangjuites as more pugnacious, and more
radical, than Koreans in other parts of the country. (Jager 2013, 418). Those who were
on the scene that May report, however, that the soldiers attacked unarmed demonstrators
with clubs, bayonets, and flamethrowers starting on the morning of May 18, and the
people of Kwangju did not start shooting back until May 21, when they acquired rifles
looted from reserve army arsenals. (Lee, J. E. 1999; Chung and Rhyu 2003; Ahn J. C.
2002)

Conclusion
Can these conflicting interpretations of behavior under colonial rule, of the Korean War,
of Park Chung’s presidency, and of the Kwangju massacre ever be reconciled? As a
historian who teaches classes on modern Korean history to university students, many of
whose parents and grandparents have relayed to them their own memories of the events
discussed in my lectures, I have had to help my students grapple with the relationship
between collective memory and history, and between collective memory and group
identity. That grappling is made more difficult when there is no broad agreement on how to depict and analyze an event we are discussing in class, and when there is clear evidence that at least one of the competing collective memories of that event has been imposed by a government or a political group trying to promote its own self-interest or ideology. Moreover, students of Korean background often resist according any validity to an interpretation of a traumatic historical event that undermines their own understanding of what it means to be a Korean.

In order to evaluate competing memories, my students need to understand how those memories are produced. At times in modern Korean history it has been the government, wielding its command over textbooks and over the content of film and literature, which has shaped the dominant collective memory. At other times, the fierce emotion of nationalism, the desire to remember ourselves and our ancestors in the best possible light, or the relevance of a particular memory to an ongoing political struggle, has determined how we “remember” what happened. Historians, and other students of history, need to be aware of how history textbooks, film and TV dramas, museums and memorial halls, and even government “fact-finding” committees are wielded as weapons in the battles fought over how specific traumatic events in recent history are to be remembered.

Once we pay more attention to how collective memories are constructed and promoted, we will become more aware of how all such memories are one-sided and incomplete. Even though we will still assume that our particular interpretation of a past event is more accurate than others, recognizing that our interpretation is not perfect and complete will make it easier for us to recognize that there may be some truth to contrary memories as well. Such recognition that we can learn from those who disagree with us is the first step toward reconciling the different sides of these history wars.

Is such reconciliation possible? As an historian, I think in the long term, in terms of decades and centuries rather than mere years. In the long term, reconciliation is possible. Once those who have personal experience with the contentious historical events discussed in this chapter, or have parents or grandparents who have passed on their passionate views about those events to them, have passed from the scene, reconciliation will definitely be possible. When a past linked to recent personal experience fades into a distant past that is not part of the personal experience of anyone alive to discuss it, it is easier to view it objectively, and to accept changes in how we have view that past. But that it will take a few more years, probably even decades. Can reconciliation come any sooner than that? Maybe, but it will still be a slow process.

Reconciliation will take a long time because Koreans are arguing about more than just how to evaluate specific moments in South Korea’s recent history. They are arguing about how to define Korea, and what direction Korea should take as it moves into the future. Their arguments are generated by fundamental political and philosophical differences. On one side, the right, are those who not only prefer to define South Korea primarily in terms of its capitalism and economic success but also prefer to view the population of South Korea as united by common values and common goals and therefore reject any historical interpretations that posits significant differences within that population. However, they exclude from that united national community people Koreans
who have, in the view of the right, been influenced by non-Korean views from the North Korean Communists or Westerners. On the other side, the left, are those who prefer to define South Korea primarily as a democratic country, which to them means recognizing that there are real differences among South Koreans both in political philosophy and in expectations for how the benefits of economic growth should be distributed. However, while insisting that significant differences in both opinion and interests must be acknowledged, the left also calls for marginalizing those with significantly different views from their own, primarily those the left interprets as representing the minority of the rich and powerful and therefore a threat to full democratization. With each side denying full legitimacy to the views of the other side, the compromises necessary for reconciliation will be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, some progress has already been made.

Younger scholars have begun to produce more nuanced interpretations of the lives of some of those deemed collaborators during the colonial period, but the general public continues to view the actions of Koreans during that time in black-and-white terms. Moreover, the attempt to view the colonial period in terms of shades of grey has been offset by the growing interest in exposing those who themselves, or whose ancestors, worked with the colonial authorities rather than opening resisting them. In addition, Korea tried a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to deal with atrocities during the Korean War and human rights abuses afterwards, but all that did was anger the right and embolden the left, hardening and widening the gap between them. Finally, though the Kwangju incident is now officially a “democratization movement,” there are still great discrepancies in how the people who were in Kwangju in 1980 remember those days and interpret their significance and how most of the rest of the Korean population thinks about the actions of the people in Kwangju at that time.

The candles illuminating the path to reconciliation may be dim, but they are still burning. As these four traumatic events fade into a more distant past, taking with them the emotions they now arouse, future generations of Koreans, scholars and non-scholars alike, may be able to find more common ground in their interpretations of these formative events in South Korea’s twentieth-century history. In the decades ahead, they may also find a way to bridge the chasm that now divides South Korean and North Korean views of recent history, and perhaps even reconcile the different visions China, Japan, and Korea have of the history of East Asia. Such reconciliation is essential, since the only alternative to peaceful co-existence is continuing conflict, and that is not an acceptable alternative.
For example, see the special issue of *Korea Journal*, vol 43, no. 2 (Autumn, 2002) on “The Issue of Settling the Past in Modern Korean History,” and the special issue of the *Review of Korean Studies*, vol 6, no. 1 (June, 2003), on “Redressing the Past Injustices: The Complex and Contested Dynamics of the Movement.” Both journals were published by organizations with ties to the Roh Moo Hyun government.

In one such example of exoneration, in 2007 a court in Seoul, after reviewing the evidence, ruled that eight men who had been executed in 1975 on charges of subversive activities as leaders of a “People’s Revolutionary Party” were innocent of all the charges against them. The court ordered the government to provide compensation to their survivors. *OhmyNews*, 2007

Lee then went farther and issued a public declaration pardoning collaborators. (T. Morris-Suzuki 2013, 165)

Ironically, among the descendants of collaborators exposed in this drive were parliamentarians from the ruling party that launched this attack, including its parliamentary leader. (Brooke 2004).

For a succinct summary of the various types of Korean nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century, see Robinson (2007). For arguments for different types of nationalism in the words of Korean nationalists themselves, see Ch’oe, et. al. (2000)

For a glimpse of the two contrasting approaches to explaining the Korea War, see Stueck (2004) and Holliday and Cumings (1988)


For a challenge to Cumings’s view that the origins of the Korea War can be found in the left-right split that existed in Korea before 1950, see Stueck 2002. Stueck’s book reflects the dominant memory of the Korean War by those on the right in South Korea itself, while Cumings’s book has been favored by those on the left for recovering memories of indigenous South Korean leftism.

For more on the difficulties Koreans have remembering the Korean War as it actually was, with atrocities committed by both sides, see Kim 2002.

See, for example, the case of the sociology Professor Kang Jeong-koo from Seoul’s Buddhist Dongguk University. (Cho 2005) Professor Kang would have been safe from legal action if he had said that Kim Il Sung intended to conquer South Korea rather than saying that Kim wanted to re-unify South and North Korea. In Korea, re-unification is viewed as a laudable goal. Therefore it is not supposed to be ascribed to Communists.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century a number of studies of Park’s double legacy appeared. For a concise summary of the debates over how to remember Park, see Seungsook Moon S. S. 2009. Three book length studies are particularly relevant: Lee, B.C. 2003); Kim H. A. and Sorensen, C. 2011; and Kim B.K. and Vogel E. 2011.

Hong 2002; Cho 2002; For a detailed report on suspicious deaths under both the Park regime and the Chun Doo-hwan regime that followed, see Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths, ed. (2004)
Information on that memorial hall can be found at http://parkchunghee.co.kr The controversy over that hall is discussed in Korea Times 2012.


I use the neutral term “tragedy” even though what transpired in Kwangju from 18 May through 27 May, 1980, is usually called a “massacre,” “democratization movement,” or “people’s righteous uprising” and was originally labeled by the South Korean government a riot or just an “incident.”

For more on what happened in Kwangju in May 1980, see Scott-Stokes and Lee Jae Eui (2000).

The official website of the May 18 Memorial Foundation (http://eng.518.org) gives a number of less than 200 confirmed deaths. Accessed August 13, 2013. However, a study published by the Korea Democracy Foundation, a government-funded institution, pointed out that “The exact number of civilian victims during the Kwangju Uprising is still unknown.” Chung and Rhyu 2003, 385. In May, 1980, I talked with an American reporter who told me that he had personally counted over 400 corpses.

Two books promoting the “righteous uprising” interpretation of the Kwangju incident are Choi 1999 and Chung and Rhyu 2003.

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